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The location of international practices:
what is human rights practice?
DAVID JASON KARP*
Abstract. This article opens up space to challenge state-centrism about human rights practice.
To do so, it presents and critically assesses four methods that can be used to determine
who and/or what counts as a part of any international practice: the agreement method, which
locates a practice by referring to speech acts that define it; the contextual method, which
locates a practice by referring to the actions, meanings, and intentions of practitioners; the
value method, which locates a practice by identifying a value or principle that the practice
reflects or instantiates; and the purpose method, which locates a practice by constructing an
account of the sociopolitical reason(s) for a practice’s existence. The purpose method, based
on an interpretation of Rawls’ constructivism, is developed, in a way that focuses on practi-
tioners’ judgement-based reasons to assign responsibility for human rights to any state or
non-state actor.
David Jason Karp is a Lecturer in Politics at the University of Glasgow. His work has appeared
in International Theory, Review of International Studies and Contemporary Political Theory. He
has a book forthcoming with Cambridge University Press entitled Responsibility for Human
Rights, which uses transnational corporations as the major example for the analysis. His current
research interests include: business and human rights; constructivism in international political
theory; non-state actors (especially in human rights and security studies); responsibility for
human rights. He was the co-convenor of the Young Researchers’ Workshop on Responsibility,
Agency and Politics in International Humanitarianism and Human Rights, at the ECPR Stand-
ing Group on International Relations general conference in Stockholm (September 2010).
Introduction
There has been much recent discussion of a ‘practice turn’ in international theory.1
Building on the work of social theorists as well as constructivist International Rela-
tions (IR) scholars, Adler and Pouliot aim to compliment existing approaches to the
study of international politics with a focus on what practitioners do.2 This article
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about the point and purpose of our concepts and practices.
1 Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina, and Eike von Savigny (eds), The Practice Turn in Contem-
porary Theory (London: Routledge, 2001).
2 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, ‘International Practices’, International Theory, 3:1 (2011), pp. 1–35.
takes a side-step from that agenda and makes a contribution from a different angle to
the idea of practice in international theory. Without implying the need to endorse or
to advocate a new ‘turn’ of any sort, this article differentiates ‘practice’ from ‘a prac-
tice’. What follows is primarily an inquiry about the latter, although an enquiry
about the latter might ultimately raise questions and challenges for the study of the
former.
Adler and Pouliot claim that ‘one cannot fully explain strategic interaction from
a practice without first asking where practices come from and how they have been
established’.3 This article’s first, methodological contribution is to argue that this
cannot be done validly without first asking what’s in, and what’s out, of the practice
in question. One cannot ask where a practice comes from without a prior account of
what that practice is.
Scholars could simply study what everyone ‘does’ and call it ‘practice’; however,
this is not good enough. International studies researchers, those both inside and
outside of the proposed practice turn, often aim to study the work of particular prac-
titioners rather than the idea of practice in general. For example, one might want to
study what human rights practitioners, or humanitarian practitioners, or practitioners
of security, or diplomacy, and so on, do. Who and what counts as acting within a
certain practice, and who and what does not? Without a method, or set of methods,
to answer this question, there is a risk of selection bias. If a researcher studies
Doctors Without Borders or the International Committee of the Red Cross – rather
than, for example, the US Navy4 – in order to arrive at conclusions about what
humanitarian practice is, based on what humanitarian practitioners do, then the
accuracy of the results generated will depend in part on whether, why, and to what
extent those non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and their work are actually
cases of humanitarian practice. More broadly, questions such as ‘what is security?’
or ‘what is diplomacy?’ are the sorts of issues that IR scholars frequently ask their
students to consider. A focus on practice provides one possible answer to exactly
this kind of question, which can then be evaluated against others.
This article’s second, substantive contribution is about human rights practice.
The article suggests how to resolve the lack of clarity that currently exists about
how best to define human rights practice, both currently, and also looking forward
toward its ongoing and future construction. The article will develop and use one
method, which I call the ‘purpose’ method, in order to locate human rights practice.
This method will be based on Rawls has called ‘constructivism in moral theory’.5
The article uses an interpretation of the point and purpose of human rights practice
to challenge the view that human rights practice is necessarily state-centric, in the
sense of being inextricably bound up with states and practices of sovereignty.
The argument will proceed as follows. The first section briefly introduces the
single-authored work of Pouliot as well as his co-authored work with Adler.6 It
critiques Pouliot’s view that practice-based logics of action can be distinguished from
3 Ibid., p. 24.
4 Chris Brown mentioned this example in the panel on ‘Middle Ground Ethics in International Relations’
at the SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference on IR, Stockholm, Sweden (10 September 2010).
5 John Rawls, ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’, Journal of Philosophy, 77:9 (1980), pp. 515–72.
See also Aaron James, ‘Constructing Justice for Existing Practice: Rawls and the Status Quo’, Philosophy
and Public Affairs, 33:3 (2005), pp. 281–316.
6 Vincent Pouliot, ‘The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities’, Interna-
tional Organization, 62:2 (2008), pp. 257–88; Adler and Pouliot, ‘International Practices’.
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the logics of consequences and appropriateness (on the specific grounds that the
former, according to him, does not involve the conscious representation of reasons
for action, whereas the latter two supposedly do).7 In fact, agents use concepts as
labels to represent practices, and in this specific sense, representation and practice
are compatible. Practitioners themselves can distinguish between the different practices
within which they act – for example, practising parenting, medicine, religion, security,
diplomacy, or human rights – and researchers should be able to make these distinc-
tions as well. The use of a unique concept to describe a cluster of human activity is a
prime facie indicator that a unique practice exists, but this indicator is not necessarily
the best or final answer about what a practice is.
The second section presents four methods that can be used to locate a practice:
the ‘agreement’ method, the ‘contextual’ method, the ‘value’ method, and the ‘purpose’
method. I shall apply each method to the question of how to locate human rights
practice. In the process, I shall provide an overview of the most significant strengths
and weaknesses of each one. According to the agreement method, practices can be
located by referring to speech acts, for example, treaties that refer to a practice and
provide rules for defining what it is. According to the contextual method, practices
can be located by exploring the intentions and priorities of practitioners who use
political concepts to advance projects that are contemporary in their time. According
to the value method, practices can be located by looking for an underlying value or
principle that a cluster of human activity aims at instantiating or achieving. Accord-
ing to the purpose method, practices can be located by taking the perspective of an
idealised practitioner who has reasons to construct a practice in order to fill a social
or political gap, and one asks, from that person’s perspective, what to do. There are
reasons to think that the purpose method responds well to some of the key weak-
nesses of the others.
The third section applies the purpose method to the question of whether assigning
responsibilities to non-state actors can occur meaningfully within human rights prac-
tice. The purpose of practices of sovereignty is to decide on limits and rules that
agents in the international system must accept in order to enable the possibility of
international relations in a sovereign-states system. It might be the case that human
rights standards represent some of these limits. However, even if this is true, all
of these questions are about practices of sovereignty. Human rights practices have
a different purpose. The purpose of human rights practice is to assign specific respon-
sibilities to the right agents, for the right reasons, to protect and to provide for
individuals’ human rights, such that every human is covered under the scope of
some agent’s human rights responsibility. The reasons that practitioners might have
had to assign human rights responsibilities to sovereign states can be reconsidered, in
today’s circumstances, to see if those same reasons would lead practitioners, of the
right kind, to identify non-state actors as the bearers of responsibility to protect and
to provide for human rights. This application of the purpose method provides a good
way to ask whether non-state actors can be responsibility-bearers within human
rights practice.
‘Political’ theories of human rights, such as those advanced by Rawls, Beitz, and
Raz, begin with the practice of human rights, rather than with abstract philosophical
7 Pouliot, ‘The Logic of Practicality’.
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accounts of objects to which all people are entitled.8 They then argue that the central
purpose of human rights practice, in light of which its location can be determined,
is tied to states and limits to their sovereignty. This article provides a different and
original interpretation, which considers the meaningful possibility of assigning and
attributing duties to protect human rights to non-state actors in some political con-
texts. Finally, the article provides suggestions for future research into the location
and nature of human rights practice, based on taking the perspective of practitioners
who have certain reasons to construct specific practices. The framework can easily be
adapted and applied to answer questions about the location of practices other than
human rights.
Practice and practices
In order to locate the contribution of this article within the existing IR literature on
practice and practices, there are many places that one could feasibly begin. These
include: constructivist and post-structuralist perspectives that draw from the social
theory of Foucault, Bourdieu, and Schatski; MacIntyre’s Aristotelian notion of
practice; Searle’s philosophy of social reality; or Oakeshott’s account, which by now
has been incorporated into the English School of IR, of practical associations.9 This
article begins with the recent work of Adler and Pouliot. This is because their
co-authored work is an attempt to synthesise their own single-authored contribu-
tions, as well as those several of the others just cited, into a larger framework: one
which has, in a relatively short period of time, already made a significant scholarly
impact.10 They provide the following usefully broad definition:
8 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples with ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1999); Charles R. Beitz, ‘Human Rights and the Law of Peoples’, in Deen K. Chatterjee
(ed.), The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), pp. 102–24; Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009); Joseph Raz, ‘Human Rights Without Foundations’, in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas
(eds), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 321–37.
9 Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Pierre Bourdieu,
Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977);
Terry Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1983); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (2nd edn, London: Duckworth, 1985); John R. Searle, The
Construction of Social Reality (London: Penguin, 1995); Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality,
trans. Robert Hurley, 3 vols (London: Vintage, 1988–90); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink,
Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1998), p. 35; Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘Social Structures and Their Threats to Moral Agency’, Philosophy,
74 (1999), pp. 311–29; Stefano Guzzini, ‘A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Rela-
tions’, European Journal of International Relations, 6:2 (2000), pp. 147–82; Schatzki, Cetina, and von
Savigny (eds), The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory; Iver B. Neumann, ‘Returning Practice to
the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy’, Millennium, 31:3 (2002), pp. 627–51; Emanuel Adler,
‘The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint and NATO’s Post Cold
War Transformation’, European Journal of International Relations, 14:2 (2008), pp. 195–230; Pouliot,
‘The Logic of Practicality’; Ted Hopf, ‘The Logic of Habit in International Relations’, European Journal
of International Relations, 16:4 (2010), pp. 539–61; Cornelia Navari, ‘The Concept of Practice in the
English School’, European Journal of International Relations, 17:4 (2011), pp. 611–30.
10 Adler, ‘The Spread of Security Communities’; Pouliot, ‘The Logic of Practicality’; Adler and Pouliot,
‘International Practices’; Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (eds), International Practices (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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Practices are socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less
competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and
discourse in and on the material world. . . . [They] are patterned actions that are embedded in
particular organized contexts and, as such, are articulated into specific types of action and are
socially developed through learning and training.11
This is slightly different from the familiar Anglo-American conception of practice as
elaborated by Rawls, for example, in the first footnote of ‘Two Concepts of Rules’
(1955).12 But there is still enough core overlap – practices are activities that structure
and organise social action for participants – to suggest one concept of practice
as a plausible starting-point, from which to begin to answer the question of what
practices are.
This is fine as an abstract definition, but it does not say much – nor does it aim to
say much – about how to locate the specific, named practices that the scholars who
suggest a ‘practice turn’ aim to discuss. There are two problems with the interpreta-
tion of practice currently on offer. The first problem, which is clarified by analys-
ing Pouliot’s single-authored work, centres on his claim that practitioners do not
‘represent’ their actions consciously.13 This overlooks that we have conceptual labels
that do represent practices, and that these labels matter. The second problem, which
becomes apparent when examining the co-authored work of Adler and Pouliot, is
that practitioners themselves are not necessarily the best or final arbiters on how to
define and to locate the practices that they practise.14
Pouliot contrasts the ‘logic of practicality’, as he calls it – I prefer the expression
‘logic of practice’ – with the two logics of social action most familiar to IR scholars
and political scientists: the logics of consequences and appropriateness.15 The latter
are, respectively, at the root of rationalist and constructivist explanations of social
action.16 According to Pouliot, agents’ action can be explained through these two
logics by looking for a set of detached interests/preferences or identities/norms.
Agents themselves might refer to directly their interests, preferences, identities, or
norms when taking decisions. Otherwise, social scientists can look to these in order
to explain action as if agents themselves had referred to them.17 For example, con-
sider how best to explain the actions of a medical doctor.18 According to the logic
of consequences, the way of explaining a doctor’s actions would be to posit that there
is a set of outcomes – the health of the patient – that the agent wants to maximise.
The doctor’s actions can be explained and predicted by assuming that the doctor will
rationally consider all available information, and use that information in order to
determine how to advance that outcome to the greatest extent possible. According
11 Adler and Pouliot, ‘International Practices’, pp. 4–5.
12 Rawls says: ‘I use the word ‘‘practice’’ . . . as a sort of technical term meaning any form of activity specified
by a system of rules which defines offices, roles, moves, penalties, defenses, and so on, and which gives
the activity its structure.’ John Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’, The Philosophical Review, 64:1 (1955),
p. 3, fn. 1. See also Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, p. 105.
13 Pouliot, ‘The Logic of Practicality’.
14 Adler and Pouliot, ‘International Practices’.
15 Pouliot, ‘The Logic of Practicality’.
16 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics
(New York: Free Press, 1989), chap. 2; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘The Institutional Dynamics
of International Political Orders’, International Organization, 52:4 (1998), pp. 943–69, pp. 949–54.
17 Pouliot, ‘The Logic of Practicality’, pp. 260–65; Hopf, ‘The Logic of Habit’, pp. 549–51.
18 Surgeons especially can only be fully trained through practice; ‘practising’ medicine is a common
expression.
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to the logic of appropriateness, the way of explaining a doctor’s actions would be to
posit that the doctor has a social role – ‘doctor’ – to which attaches a set of norma-
tive criteria about how to act well in one’s role (what counts as being a ‘good doctor’:
for example, maintaining doctor-patient confidentiality, even if doing so fails to
maximise the patient’s overall health). The doctor’s actions can then be explained
and predicted by assuming that the doctor will engage in logically valid interpreta-
tion about how best to act out the requirements of her role.
The logic of practice jettisons the idea that agents take decisions, or can be treated
‘as if ’ they take decisions, in such a reflexive, logical, and analytical way. According
to the logic of practice, as Pouliot develops it, it is the doctor’s circumstance-based
intuitive knowledge – based in the experience of practising medicine in the times
and places, and in the communities that the doctor has practised it so far – that will
explain what the doctor does.19 This practice-based logic of action is offered to com-
pliment, rather than to replace, existing theories, which hold that agents engage in
conscious deliberation about consequences and/or obligations.
At this point, the first problem crystallises. Within practices, human agents assign
labels to what they do. If one asks practitioners what they do, it is rare to find one
who simply says ‘I practise’. Doctors practise medicine. Diplomats practise diplo-
macy. Islamic people practise religion: more specifically, Islam. Practitioners practise
something. They do not just ‘practise’, but rather, they act within a practice. The
indefinite article is a small change that makes a big difference. Within the logic of
practice, agents use meaningful conceptual labels to define and to delimit practices.
That a conceptual label exists, and is employed by agents, to distinguish different
practices from one another – for example, Islam from Christianity, and Protestantism
from Catholicism, Sunni from Shi’ia, reform Judaism from orthodox Judaism20 – is
a strong prima facie indicator that a distinct practice, going under this conceptual
label, exists, and is a coherent object of analysis.
Calling a practice by its own name rather than by another name, representing it
in this specific sense, helps both agents and the social scientists who study them to
distinguish which experiences and knowledge-sets are most usefully employed in
order to decide what to do. Practical knowledge of fatherhood, for example, does not
necessarily translate into practical knowledge of diplomacy, or policing, or medicine.
Agents themselves can make these distinctions between the different practices within
which they act and decide, and so should scholars.21 In IR specifically, we should
have an account of how to decide whether and when agents are acting within prac-
tices of diplomacy, or security, or environmentalism, or humanitarianism, or human
rights, in order to discuss and to defend the validity of research that aims to study
these practices.
There are three possibilities about the relationship between practice-concepts and
practices themselves. Firstly, and most straightforwardly, one concept could pick
out one practice. Secondly, if there is no difference whatsoever, either in kind or
in category, between one putative practice and another, then some of the conceptual
labels are extraneous, do not represent distinct practices, and can be usefully removed
19 Pouliot, ‘The Logic of Practicality’, pp. 265–78.
20 This list reflects that various narrower practices can be clustered inside of wider ones.
21 Immanuel Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?’, in Mary J. Gregor (ed.), Immanuel
Kant: Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 [orig. pub.1784]), pp. 17–22;
MacIntyre, ‘Social Structures and Their Threats to Moral Agency’.
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from our social and political vocabulary.22 Thirdly, and by contrast, if we are using
one concept to refer to two distinct kinds of activity – see Berlin’s famous analysis
of ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ – then this suggests that we need additional labels
in order to capture and to represent practices that are actually distinct from one
another.23
This discussion leads to the second problem. Individual practitioners themselves,
who act within practices, and use a concept – a label for a practice – to define and
to understand what they do, are not the final arbiters on whether they are actually
acting within that practice. There is a distinction between whether agents practise
well (which is not what I have in mind), and whether they are acting in a practice
at all, despite thinking that they are. A doctor who performs surgery after a good
night of sleep is usually able to practise medicine better than a doctor who stays up
all night partying before going to work. This example highlights the appropriateness-
based logic of what it means to act well within a role, identity or practice. By com-
parison, one could argue that letting blood in order to cure fever does not count as
practising medicine, because part of practising medicine is the ability to distinguish
(through practice) between procedures that work and procedures that do not. To
use another example, the individuals who flew planes into the two towers of New
York’s World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, might have thought that by
doing so they were practising Islam. It is available, however, for others to argue
that not only were the individuals not acting well as Muslims, but moreover – and
more significantly for the present purpose – that intentionally murdering others is
not an act that can occur meaningfully within the practice of Islam, properly under-
stood, at all. These are strong reasons to reject the claim, advanced by Adler and
Pouliot that ‘defining what counts as an international practice and what does not is
best left to practitioners themselves in their actual performance of world politics’.24
So far, we lack a set of methods that can be used in order to settle these questions
about the location of practices – what’s in and what’s out? – one way or the other.
How, and according to which method, could one go about deciding who is right, and
why, about how to locate the boundaries of a specific practice? When one wants to
study what human rights practitioners do, how does one know that one is actually
studying human rights practitioners rather than agents who just ‘practise’? Beyond
human rights, the same question can be asked of any international practice. The
fact that their activities have come to be clustered under the label ‘human rights
practice’ is a crucial starting-point: a clue that there might actually be a distinct and
identifiable practice that goes under that concept. However, this starting-point is not
necessarily the best and final answer. One needs a method, or set of methods, in
order to answer such questions in a more rigorous way. The next section provides
this set of methods.
22 Saladin Meckled-Garcia, ‘Do Transnational Economic Effects Violate Human Rights?’, Ethics &
Global Politics, 2:3 (2009), pp. 259–76.
23 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), chap. 3. According to the
‘value method’, which I define and explain below – and which partly captures Berlin’s own project –
multiple practices might advance the same value. For example, redistribution through taxes in a capitalist
liberal-democracy, on the one hand, and socialism, on the other, might both be thought of as ways to
advance the value of positive liberty in practice.
24 Adler and Pouliot, ‘International Practices’, p. 6.
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Locating practices
There are four ways to test the prima facie assumption that the existence and wide-
spread use of a political concept to represent a practice actually points to the exis-
tence of a unique social practice that correctly goes under that label. I call these the
‘agreement’ method, the ‘contextual’ method, the ‘value’ method, and the ‘purpose’
method. This section uses the question of how best to locate human rights practice as
the example to illustrate and to discuss the merits and drawbacks of each method.
The section makes a case for the purpose method. But it is a certain kind of case:
one based on my evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of each method for the
sake of locating human rights practice. I encourage other scholars to consider all
four of the methods in their own research projects, but to do so more reflexively,
and more cognisant of the need to respond to potential weaknesses. All of this lays
the groundwork for the subsequent section to apply the purpose method in more
detail to the question of how to locate human rights practice.
Facts, values, and practices
It might seem at first glance that the agreement and contextual methods will locate
practices empirically, whereas the value and purpose methods will ‘merely’ allow
one to answer normative questions about what a practice requires participants to
do. However, such an interpretation would obscure the actual analysis. Each of the
four methods presented in this section responds to this same constitutive question:
what is ‘the practice’?25 They all provide ways of including or excluding people and
activities from the definition of something called a practice. Each method offers a
very different kind of answer, which includes some things while excluding others.
This is precisely the point.
Separately, it is important to note that it would be a prima facie strength of any
of the four methods if it can account well for a practice’s normativity.26 Recall the
discussion in the previous section. If one’s concern were just to locate practice –
about who is doing activity in a general sense – then it would be possible to think
about the location of this purely empirically. However, the same does not apply to
specific practices. Part of what defines a practice according to both Bourdieusian
social theory and Rawlsian political theory is that it conditions and enables judge-
ments about what participants need to do in order to act successfully within it, ‘as’
a practitioner of this or that. What a practice is is therefore bound up with the action
that seems to be called for within it in particular cases. A method that does not
account for this internal normativity might have identified ‘practice’, but it is unlikely
to have successfully located a specific practice.27 The respective answers that each
method offers to the question of what a specific practice is can therefore be assessed,
25 Alexander Wendt, ‘On Constitution and Causation in International Relations’, Review of International
Studies, 24:5 (1998), pp. 101–18.
26 I also discuss the relationships between practices and their normativity in David Jason Karp, ‘Facts and
Values in Politics and Searle’s Construction of Social Reality’, Contemporary Political Theory, 8:2
(2009), pp. 152–75.
27 In this sentence, by ‘practice’, I mean doing things in the world, perhaps in a non-reflexive way that is
formed by experience or habit, and by ‘a specific practice’, I mean patterned human activity with recog-
nised social meaning and often (though not necessarily) a distinct label.
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in part, as stronger or weaker, based on how well they capture this internally norma-
tive feature.
In addition to this internal normativity, practices can also have external norma-
tivity. Human beings, although we can be ‘programmed’ by logics of action in ways
that are still being explored and understood, still have the capacity to act autono-
mously on the world.28 We can act in ways that run contrary to rules or habits.
More specifically, we can offer, challenge, and reflect on our reasons for engaging in
certain practices.29 Those reasons are not always sound from an objective normative
perspective, but this is beside the current point. Beyond an intuitive sense that spe-
cific actions ought to be taken within a practice (internal normativity), practitioners
can, on reflection, offer reasons for why they engage in their specific practices. They
think that they ought to practise (external normativity). I should quickly say that
there are bound to be exceptions to this claim; however, the most paradigmatic inter-
national practices – security, diplomacy, human rights, religion, strategic bargaining,
even terrorism – are not obviously among those exceptions. It is therefore a prima
facie strength of a method, though not necessarily an overriding strength, if it can
locate practices that practitioners seem to have reason(s) to practise. By contrast,
theorists who locate practices in a way that can make no sense of the reasons offered
by practitioners for engaging in their practices seem less well connected to the actual
features of the world of practice than the language of a ‘practice turn’ would initially
suggest.
Agreement, contextual, and value Methods
The first method is the ‘agreement’ method. The agreement method is one way to
locate the boundaries of a practice. In order to find a social practice, according to
this method, one needs to look for, and to interpret, written and/or verbal speech
acts, which explicitly delimit a particular practice. Beitz offers an account of the
idea of human rights that relies on the agreement method.30 He defines human rights
as ‘an emergent discursive practice consisting of a set of norms for the regulation of
the conduct of governments and a range of actions open to various agents for which
a government’s failure to abide by these norms supplies reasons’.31 The rationale for
why human rights practice is directed at the conduct of governments, rather than the
conduct of other (non-state) actors, is based in what was agreed in international law
in the form of treaties, covenants, and enforcement mechanisms, most clearly crystal-
lised within the United Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on
Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).32 To be clear, he is explicitly
against the idea that agreement is the best way to determine what human rights there
are, that is, what belongs on the list of objects that human rights practice is con-
cerned to protect.33 It is at a different level, the level of what constitutes human rights
practice itself – and why, for example, it should be thought of as directed against
28 Ole Jacob Sending, ‘Constitution, Choice and Change: Problems with the ‘‘Logic of Appropriateness’’
and its Use in Constructivist Theory’, European Journal of International Relations, 8:4 (2002), pp. 443–70.
29 MacIntyre, ‘Social Structures and Their Threats to Moral Agency’.
30 Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, pp. 13–47.
31 Ibid., p. 44.
32 Ibid., pp. 14–31.
33 Ibid., pp. 73–95.
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governments – that his argument is based in an account of what international actors
came together and agreed.
The agreement method is associated to some extent with positivism in legal
theory. Hart, in a seminal text on legal positivism, argues that the law – a social
practice – can be identified by looking for a combination of authoritative primary
rules, which tell agents how they ought to act, and authoritative secondary rules,
which tell agents how to assess, to recognise, and to change the primary rules.34 The
agreement method, often to the exclusion of all others, is used by most international
lawyers to locate human rights practice. International lawyers look at texts, mainly
in the form of treaties, in order to determine what human rights and their associated
responsibilities are.35 On this view, one can know that humanitarianism, human
rights, and environmentalism are distinct practices, because each has its own branch
of international law. This method, in turn, can be used to determine whether and
when agents’ actions fall inside or outside of practices. For example, the ‘business
and human rights’ activism of NGOs such as Amnesty International, the Center for
Constitutional Rights, and EarthRights International – aimed at holding business
actors to account for violations of the normative standards associated with human
rights – might be defined, by the agreement method, as operating outside of human
rights practice. This is because, according to this method, the practice is constituted,
through agreement, by a focus on states as the primary human rights responsibility-
bearers. This would remain so unless, firstly, the subjects of international law can
agree, in a way that successfully becomes a part of international law, that the human
rights regime should be extended to include businesses as responsibility-bearers; and/
or, secondly, it can be demonstrated that non-state actors already have international-
legal human rights obligations.36 A move toward agreement on these issues is arguably
in process at the UN Human Rights Council, in which the business and human rights
policy agenda has been led by John Ruggie since 2005.37
One advantage of the agreement method is that it offers a clear reason, based on
the idea of consent, as to why actors ought to follow the action- and policy-guidance
that falls under a specific practice. In other words, it identifies an object as ‘the prac-
tice’ that already has a claim to external normativity. There is a bridge between
analytical statements such as ‘human rights practice requires action A or policy P’
and normative statements such as ‘agents actually have reason to do A or to imple-
ment P’. There are important objections to the idea that the agreement or consent of
a majority successfully creates normativity. The agreement of some might be detri-
mental to others, especially when those others cannot offer meaningful consent.38 But,
34 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997 [orig. pub. 1961]),
pp. 78–123.
35 Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2009).
36 Steven R. Ratner, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’, Yale Law
Journal, 111:3 (2001), pp. 443–545; Philip Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005); Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
37 John G. Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, A/HRC/
8/5, Human Rights Council, UN General Assembly, 8th session (New York: United Nations, 2008),
available at: {http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/8session/reports.htm} accessed 28 January
2011.
38 Susan E. Babbitt, ‘The Construction of Social Reality, John R. Searle’, The Philosophical Review, 106:4
(1997), pp. 608–10; Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third
World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 178.
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in the agreement method, at least there is an obvious bridge between the analytical
and the normative that can be assessed according to the well known benefits and
drawbacks of the idea of consent as a basis of obligation.39
Overall, this article does not endorse the agreement method. It can be criticised
on the following grounds. Either: It needs to limit itself to making claims such as:
only those texts that make explicit claims about primary and secondary ‘human
rights’ rules and standards (that is, beginning with the publication of the UDHR)
are part of human rights practice. This would exclude earlier natural-rights texts
such as the American and French constitutions, and positive-rights texts such as the
body of English common law beginning with the Magna Carta, from the scope
of human rights practice.40 This narrow focus on the exact phrase ‘human rights’
in texts that meet legal-positivist standards of recognition also would exclude pre-
World War II agreements to protect minority rights and labour rights; these were
central concerns of the interwar period.41 In short, this method can offer a clear
account of what counts as part of the practice, but in a way that fails to capture
elements that seem, at first glance, to be at the practice’s core. Or: If those who rely
on the agreement method of locating a practice choose to include some of these other
texts, despite the lack of explicit and exact reference to ‘human rights’, then the
method lacks a principled basis upon which to select which, if any, of those texts
belong within the same practice as the UDHR. Accepting even a handful of texts
that do not have the exact phrase ‘human rights’ in them starts users of the agreement
method down a slippery slope that would make every historical legal text aimed at
advancing human well-being a ‘human rights text’. A similar point can be made
about other, non-written kinds of speech acts. Different methods are therefore needed
in order to find an answer to this dilemma that does not rely on pure, unfounded
intuition about what human rights practice is.
The second method is the ‘contextual’ method. The contextual method rejects a
narrow focus on what has been agreed in written and verbal speech acts. It focuses,
rather, on the meaning of concepts in the political and historical contexts in which
they arise and operate. More specifically, the method requires the study of the back-
ground knowledge and intentions of the actors who use ideas, in order to advance
political projects that are contemporary in their time. This way of approaching the
construction and meaning of political ideas is frequently associated with the early work
of Quentin Skinner, as well as other founders of the Cambridge School of political
thought such as Pocock.42 It can also be associated with the IR constructivist focus on
the work of social activists, whose entrepreneurship – including attempts at socialisa-
tion, persuasion, and framing – creates the norms that only result in interstate agree-
ment at a later stage in a complex and potentially long process or ‘lifecycle’.43
39 A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1979), pp. 57–100.
40 Chris Brown, ‘Universal Human Rights: A Critique’, in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds),
Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 103–27.
41 Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia: Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), pp. 94–8.
42 Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, History and Theory, 8:1 (1969),
pp. 3–53; J. G. A. Pocock, Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008). See also Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson (eds),
Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
43 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, Inter-
national Organization, 52:4 (1998), pp. 887–917; Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders; Thomas
Risse, ‘ ‘‘Let’s Argue!’’: Communicative Action in World Politics’, International Organization, 54:1
(2000), pp. 1–39.
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This method is the most directly relevant of the four to the practice turn’s
proposal that the study of International Relations is intertwined with the study of
what practitioners do. Barnett, for example, has done influential work that studies
humanitarianism by closely examining the work of organisations such as Doctors
Without Borders and the International Committee of the Red Cross. He looks at
the ways in which the nature of humanitarianism has ‘transformed’ (for better or
worse) due to the shifting beliefs, values, and priorities of these actors.44 Similarly,
Hopgood has produced a fascinating study of Amnesty International. In it, he
describes the organisation’s angst over the question of whether human rights practice
is to be defined and implemented in terms of the production of transcendental
authority – a quasi-religious faith in absolute values – or whether it is a consequen-
tialistic and pragmatic attempt to secure, for individuals, the objects of their rights.45
The point is that what these actors do – the way that they use concepts, and assign
meanings to those concepts, in order to advance political projects – can be viewed as
constituting (respectively) humanitarian practice and human rights practice. Further-
more, the definition and boundaries of such practices can change over time, as
practitioners make adjustments to their decisions and actions.
The prima facie assumption that a unique concept picks out a unique practice
is, in this way, testable by a history-of-ideas analysis of when a particular concept
actually came into widespread political use in order to advance social and political
projects that are contemporary in their time. The agreement method would locate
the beginning of human rights practice in the period from 1945 to 1950, because it
would define the boundaries of that practice in terms of speech acts such as the
UDHR and subsequent international agreements in the twentieth century. By con-
trast, the contextual method would look for the beginning of the adoption and use,
by social activists, of the specific compound concept ‘human rights’ in order to
describe and to cluster their activity. The origins of this entrepreneurship can be
found most prominently not in the late 1940s, but rather, in the early 1940s. For
example: H. G. Wells explicitly organised his political activism around the idea of
‘human rights’; US President Franklin D. Roosevelt introduced the term into official
political discourse in 1941 in connection with his ideas about the four freedoms; the
idea’s use became more widespread in 1943, up to and including the release of a US
Government document on ‘Human Rights and the World Order’.46 UNESCO then
commissioned and published a volume illuminating the way that political thinkers
interpreted this concept – which in some ways, was linked to the earlier traditions
of ‘natural rights’ and the ‘rights of man’, but which was understood, by those thinkers
in their own time, to be genuinely innovative – around the time of its textual codifi-
cation in 1948.47
I shall now examine strengths and weaknesses that one might attribute to the
contextual method. One potential strength is that, as with the agreement method, it
44 Michael Barnett, ‘Humanitarianism Transformed’, Perspectives on Politics, 3:4 (2005), pp. 723–40.
45 Stephen Hopgood, Keepers of the Flame: Understanding Amnesty International (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2006).
46 Jan Herman Burgers, ‘The Road to San Francisco: The Revival of the Human Rights Idea in the
Twentieth Century’, Human Rights Quarterly, 14:4 (1992), pp. 464–70; Paul Gordon Lauren, The
Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (2nd edn, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2003), pp. 135–65.
47 UNESCO (ed.), Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations (New York: Columbia University Press,
1949).
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provides a clear, empirically grounded way to locate an object as ‘the practice’.
Many scholars seek to justify social-scientific claims to knowledge about any given
topic, such as the location of a practice, by developing testable hypotheses, which
can then be proven as right or wrong through research.48 The agreement method
generates clear, falsifiable claims: either agreement happened or it did not. This is
arguably one of the agreement method’s prima facie strengths, even though this
article did not endorse it due to its overriding weaknesses. The contextual method
seems at first glance to duplicate this strength, while at the same time overcoming
the agreement method’s blind spot for the non-inclusion of the social activity that
leads up to agreement within the definition of the practice. Careful readers might
already have anticipated the problem with this argument. The contextual method,
when it is applied to locate practices, works through a (discredited) verificationist
method of hypothesis-testing rather than through falsification.49 Take, for example,
the claim that human rights practices involve the international community’s assign-
ment of responsibilities primarily to states and not to non-state actors. This would
be easy to verify by assembling a body of contextual evidence that supports this
interpretation of activists’ intentions in constructing a practice, associated with the
concept of human rights, at a certain point in history. The claim is also remarkably
easy to falsify by finding other activists whose intentions and use of the concept are
different. I can think of no interesting and meaningful contextual-method-based
claims about the location of human rights practice that could withstand a falsifica-
tionist standard of justification. There will always be at least some activists with
different understandings and different intentions. Scholars who are drawn to purely
empirical methods for locating practices are often the same ones who tend to think
that the contextual method is the strongest, especially vis-a`-vis other explicitly non-
positivist examples such as the purpose method. However, the contextual method
does not then fit with a basic standard of justification for positivist research.
There is a potential response to this, based on the fact that only some norms and
practices become widely adopted whereas others do not, and that the widely adopted
norms and practices are likely to be the right ones because they have gone through
a quasi-democratic, intersubjective selection process.50 This, however, is clearly a
collapse back into the agreement method.51 In the final analysis, the contextual
method is a helpful way to locate ‘practice’, when that term is understood (without
the indefinite article) as the description of social action in terms of activity that prac-
titioners do. However, it becomes less helpful if one wants to locate and to study a
specific international practice, such as human rights, because we come straight back
to the same problem of which putative practitioners are right, and which are not,
about their understanding of the location of that practice. An explanation of how a
practice came about is not necessarily the strongest way to locate a practice for the
sake of further research into it.
One potential weakness of the contextual method is that it cannot account for the
normativity of the objects that it identifies as practices. The agreement method can,
48 Patrick T. Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2011).
49 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959).
50 Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The Role of Consequences, Comparison and Counterfactuals in Constructivist
Ethical Thought’, in Richard Price (ed.), Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 90–1.
51 Karp, ‘Facts and Values in Politics’.
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at the very least, rely on the notion of consent in order to account for why agents
ought to follow whatever practice-specific guidance the method locates. But with the
contextual method, there is no apparent bridge all – save for the quasi-democratic
collapse into the agreement method just mooted – between analytical and normative
statements. That certain networks of people engage in, and collectively define, a
particular kind of social activity is not a sufficient normative reason for them, or for
anyone else, actually to do it. This article does not, of course, dispute the fact that
there can be practices that no one should be engaged in. My point, however, is a
slightly different one. The contextual method can be used to identify all kinds of
human activities and habits, much of which no one would seem to have any reason
to follow as a structured practice. By reading out the normativity that international
practitioners themselves understand to be at the core of their practices, the contextual
method seems insufficiently connected to the reality of the objects that it aims to
identify.
The third method is the ‘value’ method. According to the value method, a prac-
tice can be located by identifying a unique value or principle that a cluster of social
activity is aimed at advancing or achieving. If this can be found successfully, then
any human action – regardless of the historical context in which this action occurs –
aimed at advancing or instantiating this same value or principle can be identified as
part of the practice in question. One’s original conception of the practice can then be
revised in light of this new information about how best to define it. This method can
be associated with Dworkin’s interpretivism, which contains a three-step method to
identify, interpret, and reconstruct a practice in light of its fit with a specific value.52
It can also be unpacked in light of Berlin’s perhaps more widely known work on
the concept of liberty. Berlin argued that ‘liberty’ is two concepts rather than one,
because ‘negative liberty’ aims at advancing autonomy and non-interference, whereas
‘positive liberty’ aims at advancing self-rule and self-actualisation.53 Different values
imply different concepts, and this can often require different practices that might con-
flict with each other, both at the level of action-guidance and at the level of principle.
Dworkin essentially provides a value-monist version of the same method, according
to which different practices and values, for example, security and human rights, must
be made to cohere both with each other and also with higher-order values.54 A key
point for this article is that, according to the value method, the practice of human
rights can exist irrespective of whether practitioners have a concept of human rights. In
this respect, the value method is quite different from the other two methods examined
so far.
Starting with the prima facie assumption that the widespread use of the ‘human
rights’ concept during the World War II era and in its aftermath locates a distinct
practice, one could then test this assumption by trying to identify some value such
as the equal moral worth of individuals (Dworkin’s view) or respect for the values
that constitute personhood (Griffin’s view) as the best possible normative justification
52 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (London: Fontana, 1986), pp. 45–86.
53 Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, chap. 3.
54 See Dworkin, Law’s Empire, pp. 176–244; Ronald Dworkin, ‘Do Liberal Values Conflict?’, in Mark
Lilla, Ronald Dworkin, and Robert B. Silvers (eds), The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin (New York: New
York Review of Books, 2001), pp. 73–90. See also Jeremy Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty: The Image
of Balance’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 11:2 (2003), pp. 191–210; Jeremy Waldron, ‘Safety and
Security’, Nebraska Law Review, 85:2 (2011), pp. 454–507.
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for that cluster of social and political activity.55 If one can successfully locate a value
of this kind, then one can use the value to broaden one’s conception of human rights
practice to include other kinds of historical and contemporary socio-political activity,
which aims at advancing that same value – regardless of the non-use of the specific
compound concept ‘human rights’ by practitioners and political thinkers to describe
and to cluster their action. The eighteenth-century concern with the ‘rights of man’
and/or the broader historical tradition of ‘liberal rights’ could be read back through
history, in a way that would be anathema to the contextual method, and included
within one’s conception of human rights practice, due to the way that the activities
associated with these ideas advance a single specific value.56
The value method unmistakably provides the bridge between the analytical and
the normative that the contextual method lacks. However, the way in which this
bridge is provided raises a new problem. Assume, for the sake of argument that the
value method ends up successfully identifying the equal moral worth of individuals
as the value that allows one to locate human rights practice. It might then be advis-
able for each agent to ignore the practical guidance that comes specifically out of
human rights practice, preferring instead to go directly to the value, and to interpret
for him- or herself what equality requires. If this method of identifying a particular
object as ‘the practice’ in question is sound, then once one gets to the value, the prac-
tice itself can drop out of the picture. It becomes unclear why agents would follow
the ‘logic of practicality’ rather than a reflexive logic of doing what best advances
the value that helps to define and to locate the practice in the first place.
Furthermore, there are actual and conceivable practices, other than human rights
that advance the value of the equal moral worth of individuals. Humanitarianism,
charity, and development assistance are all candidates. The value method therefore
runs the risk of blurring together practices that, in practice, are notably distinct.
International human rights law, for example, assigns duties to states to protect a
broad range of civil-political and socioeconomic normative standards, whereas inter-
national humanitarian law places special focus on limits to action by combatants
toward each other and toward non-combatants in the context of armed conflict.
(Humanitarianism itself can, of course, be viewed as much broader than its inter-
national-legal instantiation.) Otherwise, the value method runs the converse risk of
accepting that various practices, such as human rights and humanitarianism, can be
associated with the same value, but without giving any importance to those practices.
Normative theorists who believe in the practice-independence of moral principles
would be happy with this picture.57 However, taking a broader view, there is a
certain counter-intuitiveness about beginning by asking how to locate a practice,
and then moving to the conclusion that the practice itself can be ultimately dis-
regarded in favour of asking normative questions about how to act in line with
abstract values.58
55 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977); Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign
Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008).
56 Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981–1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993); Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007).
57 G. A. Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31:3 (2003), pp. 211–45. See also
Andrea Sangiovanni, ‘Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality’, Journal of Political Philosophy,
16:2 (2008), pp. 137–64; Laura Valentini, ‘Global Justice and Practice-Dependence: Conventionalism,
Institutionalism, Functionalism’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 19:4 (2011), pp. 399–418.
58 Philippa Foot, ‘Moral Arguments’, Mind, 67 (1958), pp. 502–13; Philippa Foot, ‘Moral Beliefs’, Pro-
ceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59 (1958–9), pp. 83–104.
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The purpose method
The fourth method is the ‘purpose’ method. This method is an adaptation of what
Rawls has called ‘Kantian constructivism in moral theory’.59 I shall therefore outline
the most basic contours of moral constructivism, as Rawls understood it, before pro-
ceeding. Consider this quotation:
What distinguishes the Kantian form of constructivism is essentially this: it specifies a particular
conception of the person as an element in a reasonable procedure of construction, the outcome
of which determines the content of the first principles of justice.60
Rawls has characterised the operative conception of the person, for the purpose
of constructing the principles of justice for the basic structure of a society, as the ‘free
and equal moral person’ behind a veil of ignorance.61 It is possible to interpret this
approach in at least two different ways, and I shall adopt the second. Firstly, one
could focus on the plain fact that Rawls requires idealised agents, who do not
actually exist in our world – in which we are fairly attached to our own personal
circumstances and perspectives – in order to provide the perspective from which
justice can be constructed. Indeed, Aaron James has listed, as one of the steps of
Rawls’ constructivist method: ‘draw a veil of ignorance’.62 One recent example of
this interpretation in IR literature is provided by Renee Jeffery, who draws from the
idea of the veil of ignorance in order to characterise Rawls’s approach as ‘extreme
rationalism’.63 Actual people have considerable difficulty abstracting away their
identities in the way that Rawls’s approach seems, on this interpretation, to require.
This leads to the objection that Rawls stretches his approach beyond the bounds
of practical possibility and usefulness.64 Followers of Habermas, for example, often
suggest that we can construct just (and justified) practices by idealising the structure
within which people decide, but not the people themselves.65
However, even though the veil of ignorance is an important feature of Rawlsian
approaches to justice, it is not necessarily one of the steps that one must take to
extend Rawls’s constructivist method to other practices. There is a second interpreta-
tion, as follows. The conception of the person who would have the authority to take
moral and political decisions within a practice is subject to the reasonable agreement
of actual people. According to Rawls’ constructivism, as I interpret it, actual people
in actual conditions are required to appoint a non-real person, conceptualised in
59 Rawls, ‘Kantian Constructivism’. See also Brian M. Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1996); Onora O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical
Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); James, ‘Constructing Justice for Existing
Practice’; Saladin Meckled-Garcia, ‘On the Very Idea of Cosmopolitan Justice: Constructivism and
International Agency’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 16:3 (2008), pp. 245–71.
60 Rawls, ‘Kantian Constructivism’, p. 516.
61 Ibid., pp. 515–72.
62 James, ‘Constructing Justice for Existing Practice’, p. 282.
63 Renee Jeffery, ‘Reason, Emotion, and the Problem of World Poverty: Moral Sentiment Theory and
International Ethics’, International Theory, 3:1 (2011), p. 150.
64 Richard Price, ‘Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics’, International Organization, 62:2 (2008),
pp. 191–220.
65 Ju¨rgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, trans. Thomas McCarthy, 2 vols (Cambridge:
Polity, 1986). See also Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in
Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992); Risse, ‘ ‘‘Let’s Argue!’’ ’; Neta Crawford, Argument
and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization and Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Markus Kornprobst, ‘Argumentation and Compromise: Ireland’s
Selection of the Territorial Status Quo Norm’, International Organization, 61:1 (2007), pp. 69–98.
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a particular way, as an epistemic authority. Then, in order to take substantive
decisions about what to do, those same (actual) people can then ask themselves
‘what would a person, conceived in such a way, decide to do?’ The free and equal
moral person, behind the veil of ignorance, whose purpose is to discover principles
to which all other people conceptualised in this way could reasonably agree, is the
conception of the person for constructing the practice of justice. This is due to the
specific contours and purpose of that practice. Practices other than justice might
require different conceptions of the person from whose standpoint that practice
can be located and constructed. In fact, difference should be expected. There is no
a priori reason to think that the free and equal moral person behind a veil of
ignorance is the appropriate authority on decisions about the location of human
rights. The key point is that the description of the person from whose standpoint a
practice is constructed does the heavy lifting, according to this method.
A famous episode from Plato’s Republic helps to illuminate this point.66 Prompted
by Socrates, the characters set out to answer the question ‘what is justice?’ Before they
can do this in a substantive way, they first must establish that they are discussing the
same subject matter: the same sphere of human life. Thrasymachus offers the view
that justice is best located (as the starting-point) by looking for a practice of the
strong dominating the weak. However, in saying this, Thrasymachus reveals himself
as an unsuitable candidate to participate in a conversation about how to locate
justice. The substantive conclusions that he would arrive at, if any, would be about
something other than what everyone else is talking about. He therefore needs to leave
the table before the discussion can fruitfully begin. Plato’s substantive conclusions
often overshadow this method, which has some elements that are echoed in Rawls:
only certain parties are admitted into a discussion about the nature of justice, for
reasons having to do with their successful recognition of the initial location, point,
and purpose of the practice under discussion. As characters in a dialogue, these are
non-real people. But actual people in the actual world can still have meaningful
debates about what Glaucon, Socrates, or Thrasymachus would decide, given who
they are, and given their purposes in constructing a practice. Think about the kind of
debate that occurs all the time about what a parent, or particular friend, or retired
colleague, with certain concerns, commitments, experiences, and character traits,
would do about a given issue, if only they were here. There is nothing ‘extremely
rationalistic’ nor unrealistic about this process.
According to the purpose method, practices are defined and located not by the
practical judgements of actual practitioners. Rather, they are located by the judg-
ments that we think that idealised practitioners, with certain purposes in constructing
a specific practice, would arrive at. A substantive account of who these practitioners
are is bound to be contestable, but that is not an excuse not to provide one, for
others to consider and to debate. The next section of this article does this, using the
example of human rights practice.
In the following ways, the purpose method does not contain the weaknesses of
the agreement method (that consent, by itself, is a problematic normative foundation
for practical action-guidance; and that elements of the practice are either uncritically
excluded or otherwise included in a way that introduces a slippery-slope issue), the
66 Plato, The Republic, trans. Desmond Lee (London: Penguin, 1974).
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contextual method (which identifies objects that, unlike our actual practices, have no
clear link to normativity), and the value method (according to which practices them-
selves drop out of the picture, in favour of agents pursuing values directly). The idea
of a purpose robustly makes sense of practitioners’ reasons to practice. However, the
original practitioners might – under the circumstances just described – decide to set up
authoritative rules, guidelines, and limits that practitioners in today’s world have to
work within. This enables the advancement of a purpose through the establishment
of a practice, rather than relying on agents’ reflexive and more direct pursuit of val-
ues or outcomes.67 Although not the end of the story, this seems to be an important
step, and an improvement on other methods for locating human rights practice.
The purpose of human rights practice
This section applies the purpose method in order to show how it can adjudicate com-
peting claims about the nature of human rights practice. It distinguishes the point of
the practice of sovereignty from the point of the practice of human rights, in order to
critique the widespread view, in IR and international law, that human rights practice
necessarily places primary duties on states. The idea that sovereignty and human
rights are bound together in this way has been recently reaffirmed at the international
level, in the form of the Responsibility to Protect policy framework, which outlines
how and why sovereignty should be viewed as conditional on states’ treatment of
residents.68 This putative link between human rights and states’ sovereignty also
drives most so-called ‘political’ theories of human rights.69 An analysis of this is
significant, because of the amount of contemporary policy work and practitioner
effort, as introduced above in the analysis of the agreement method, to bring non-
state actors in to an international-legal human rights framework that seems to be
designed to assign duties to protect human rights to states.
Is the ‘business and human rights’ activity of human rights practitioners necessarily
a part of human rights practice just because those practitioners do it? Do responsibil-
ities to protect human rights actually fall on non-actors such as private military and
security companies, especially in zones of weak or mixed governance?70 The textual
67 Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’; Oakeshott, On Human Conduct; Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Rela-
tions of States.
68 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001); see also Christian Reus-Smit,
‘Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty’, Review of International Studies, 27:4
(2001), pp. 519–38.
69 Rawls, Law of Peoples, pp. 78–81; Beitz, ‘Human Rights and the Law of Peoples’; Beitz, The Idea
of Human Rights; Raz, ‘Human Rights Without Foundations’. See also Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Sub-
sistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 29–34;
Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?’, International Affairs, 74:1 (1998),
pp. 1–23; Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (2nd edn, Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2003), pp. 57–70; Reus-Smit, ‘Human Rights and the Social Construction of
Sovereignty’; Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights (2nd edn,
Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 38–41 and 70–91.
70 James Pattison, ‘Outsourcing the Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian Intervention and Private
Military and Security Companies’, International Theory, 2:1 (2010), pp. 1–31; Rita Abrahamsen and
Michael C. Williams, Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics (Cambridge:
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method might uncritically say ‘no’ to both questions. In trying to expand the scope of
duties to protect human rights to non-state actors, a self-identified human rights
practitioner cannot, on this account, be acting successfully within human rights
practice, because of the centrality of states to that practice according to most inter-
pretations of positive international law. The contextual method might uncritically
say ‘yes’ to both questions. To the extent that practitioners have changed the targets
of their actions to include non-state actors, this straightforwardly means, on this
account, that human rights practice now includes the duties of those actors. How-
ever, the reason for the answer to the second question would rest, in a problematic
way, on the answer to the first. The value method might say ‘no’ to the first question
but ‘yes’ to the second. From a normative perspective, we all have moral duties not
to cause serious and avoidable harm to others. However, an application of the value
method in this way begs the question of whether these universal moral duties really
constitute the location of a particular international practice called ‘human rights’.
This section applies the purpose method to suggest that actual practitioners are not
the final authorities on whether they are acting successfully within human rights
practice. The answers to questions about the location of human rights practice lie in
the judgement of idealised (rather than actual) practitioners, defined in such a way
that they have particular reasons to which they refer when constructing and recon-
structing a practice.
The purpose method has three steps. Firstly, one needs a lock on the people who
have reason to fill a gap in socio-political life by creating something called human
rights practice. Actual people in today’s world need to try to think in terms of what
those constructed people would judge and do. Secondly, one needs to establish and
defend a view on what their reasons and purposes are in constructing a practice.
Thirdly, one needs to establish and defend a view on what those people, with those
reasons, would decide in particular cases, with regard to the ongoing construction
and reconstruction of a practice, according to the logic of practice. The overriding
aim of this section is to illustrate this method.
In order to distinguish between sovereignty and human rights practices, accord-
ing to the purpose method, one needs to see if one can draw a sound distinction
between two different kinds of practitioners who have different purposes in construct-
ing practices linked to those concepts. Practices of sovereignty involve placing limits
on what individual participants (states) can do in pursuit of their values, goals and
ends, in order to create the basic conditions of further interaction in an international
system made up of more than one such unit.71 It is possible, as suggested by Rawls,
Beitz, and Raz that human rights standards should play a role in determining the
constitutive rules of sovereignty.72 In order to answer this kind of question, one may
take the perspective of the idealised sovereignty practitioner (with the capacity for
context-based judgement as identified by the logic of practice) whose purpose is to
determine the shared rules and understandings that make it possible for the main
71 Oakeshott, On Human Conduct; Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States; David Jason Karp,
‘The Utopia and Reality of Sovereignty: Social Reality, Normative IR and ‘‘Organized Hypocrisy’’ ’,
Review of International Studies, 34:2 (2008), pp. 313–35.
72 Rawls, Law of Peoples; Beitz, ‘Human Rights and the Law of Peoples’; Beitz, The Idea of Human
Rights; Raz, ‘Human Rights Without Foundations’.
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units in the international system to interact with each other. One needs to ask, from
that person’s perspective, whether there is good reason to include respect for human
rights standards in this set of basic limits. It is important, however, to recognise
that this discussion is about is about the location and (re)construction practices of
sovereignty, rather than practices of human rights. The starting-point is the perspec-
tive of the idealised sovereignty practitioner.
In order to use the purpose method to check whether it is necessarily true that
the primary purpose of human rights practice itself is to constrain practices of
sovereignty, one must start from the other end: from the perspective of a different
idealised practitioner, with a different set of reasons and purposes. A brief historical
interpretation of the distinctive gap in international-political life that a practice called
‘human rights practice’ has the potential to fill is a starting-point that can help
to develop an account of the reasons for and purpose of this practice. During the
interwar period and World War II, pre-existing universal ‘rights’ concepts, such as
‘liberal rights’, ‘natural rights’, and the ‘rights of man’ – if understood simply as a
normative list of material and abstract objects to which all people are entitled – did
nothing in practice to stop widespread humanitarian atrocities.73 States breached
responsibilities to protect and to provide for the basic rights of all of the insiders
within their territories. In large part, they did so by redefining insider identity in a
way that allowed European governments, including many of the Allies, who would
not accept nationality-stripped refugees, to justify protecting certain humans’ basic
rights and not others’. Human rights, the specific compound concept, as a con-
temporary political idea (distinct from other ‘rights’ concepts in the same family),
came about in the context of the breakdown of modern states into war machines,
which did not protect or provide for the rights of all of the individuals within their
sovereign territory.74 The idea also came about in the context of the international
community’s unwillingness to accept responsibility to individuals and groups beyond
borders.75 Finally, it came about in the context of a normative rejection of European
colonialism, at least in official public discourse, if not always in fact.76 Long-standing
practices of declaring universal rights and outlining responsibilities that we all have
to others, based, for example, on Kant’s categorical imperative or Mill’s utilitarian-
ism, did nothing to prevent the atrocities that occurred in the context of the twentieth
century.77
What is missing from this picture is a practice of assigning responsibility to the
right agents, and holding these agents to account for breaches of their responsibility,
such that all individuals are covered under the scope of some specifiable agent’s
sphere of human rights responsibility, even if – perhaps especially if – the states within
which individuals reside act irresponsibly toward them. This is the gap that human
73 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 1968), pp. 267–302.
74 UNESCO (ed.), Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations.
75 Onora O’Neill, ‘Agents of Justice’, Metaphilosophy, 32:1/2 (2001), pp. 184–5; Saskia Sassen, Authority,
Territory, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (updated edn, Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2006), pp. 277–321; Patrick Hayden, ‘From Exclusion to Containment: Arendt, Sovereign Power,
and Statelessness’, Societies Without Borders, 3:2 (2008), pp. 248–69.
76 Paul Gordon Lauren, Power and Prejudice: Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1988), pp. 210–50; A. W. Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain
and the Genesis of the European Convention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
77 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991 (London: Michael
Joseph, 1994).
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rights practice needs to be able to fill. It is what makes it distinct from other, related,
rights practices.
In this context, and throughout the second half of the twentieth century, it might
have seemed appropriate, to idealised practitioners, to assign human rights responsi-
bility primarily to states for at least two reasons. Both reasons are based on Weber’s
definition of the state as the entity that ‘successfully claims the monopoly on the
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’, but each reason focuses on
a different aspect of this definition.78 The first reason is the capacity to cause harm
that follows from the monopolisation of violence. According to this line of thought,
the scale of the humanitarian atrocities committed during the interwar period, World
War II, and the era of colonialism, was possible to achieve only because of the ability
of modern states, with modern technology, to cause harm to others in a systematic
and brutally efficient fashion.79 Human rights responsibility can be linked, for this
reason, to the enhanced capacity of particular actors, in the modern context, to cause
harm to individuals in a systematic way.80 The second reason focuses instead on
the fact that the state’s monopoly on the right to use force is defined as legitimate.
According to a Weberian picture, states use violence in the name of the public: for
the public good rather in the name of individual or private interests. An actor’s
public nature or role can be a reason for practitioners to think that those (public) actors
are the right actors to identify as the protectors and providers of human rights.81
In order to use the purpose method to answer the question of whether non-state
actors can be bear responsibilities to protect human rights within today’s inter-
national human rights practice, one needs to take the perspective of the idealised
human rights practitioner, and to ask what he or she would judge as falling within
the scope of human rights practice, and why. These same two reasons, capacity and
publicness, which would have been available to practitioners who wanted to con-
struct human rights practice in a context where it did not exist, can be considered
in today’s context, to assess whether and to what extent it is actually the case that
sovereign states are the sole appropriate bearers of human rights responsibility for
those reasons.82
In terms of the first criterion, ‘capacity’, it has by now become clear that, espe-
cially weak states or weak governance zones – what Robert Jackson has called
‘quasi-states’ – states can lack the capacity to protect and to provide for a full range
78 Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds), From Max Weber:
Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 77–128.
79 Donnelly, Universal Human Rights, pp. 57–70.
80 Ibid; Robert E. Goodin, ‘What is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?’, Ethics, 98:4 (1988),
pp. 663–86; Henry Shue, ‘Mediating Duties’, Ethics, 98:4 (1988), pp. 687–704; O’Neill, ‘Agents of
Justice’; Christian Barry, ‘Global Justice: Aims, Arrangements, and Responsibilities’, in Toni Erskine
(ed.), Can Institutions Have Responsibilities? Collective Moral Agency and International Relations,
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 230–31; Leif Wenar, ‘Responsibility and Severe Poverty’,
in Thomas Pogge (ed.), Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor?
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 255–74.
81 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York:
Basic Books, 1977); David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995); Rawls, The Law of
Peoples, pp. 38–9; Allen Buchanan, ‘Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian
World’, Ethics, 110:4 (2000), pp. 697–721; Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cam-
bridge: Polity, 2002), pp. 59–63.
82 David Jason Karp, Responsibility for Human Rights: Transnational Corporations, Principle and Practice
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
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of human rights.83 By contrast, especially in the numerous contexts where the provi-
sion of services ranging from security and policing to health and education by the
private sector is the norm rather than the exception, non-state actors do have a
capacity both to cause harm to individuals in a systematic and organised fashion,
and also to protect and to provide for the objects of many human rights.84 Therefore,
if ‘capacity to cause harm to individuals in an organised, systemic and distinctly
modern fashion’ is a valid reason to assign human rights responsibility to a particular
actor, then an analysis of many of today’s empirical contexts reveals that non-state
actors meet this criterion, in addition to states.
In terms of the second criterion, ‘publicness’, the state’s monopoly on violence
is not necessarily legitimate just because violence has been monopolised. As Charles
Tilly, on the one hand, and critical-security-studies scholars, on the other, have
noted, many states resemble ‘racketeer’ outfits – which cause threats and then justify
their use of force on the grounds that those threats need to be eliminated – more so
than they resemble virtuous providers of peace, order, and security for a public.85
Furthermore, it is possible to supplement the Weberian picture with other approaches
to social theory in order to assess whether and in which circumstances non-state actors
can ever be relevantly public. Robert Cox, for example, looks at the exploited class
and its leadership, rather than at the state, in order to find actors that truly represent
the public.86 This alternative would provide a basis to identify some non-state actors
as ‘public’ in the sense relevant to the idealised practitioner’s judgement about who
is the right agent to bear human rights responsibility such that every individual is
covered.
These questions about the role of non-state actors within human rights practice –
and some potential answers to them – have been used as an illustration of how the
purpose method works, in a way that provides a substantive challenge to the idea
that human rights practices are inextricably bound up with practices of sovereignty.
The purpose method provides a methodological framework that allows one to
develop an account of what the purpose of human rights practice actually is. The
(contestable) conception of the ideal practitioner, and the judgements that that
practitioner would arrive at given his or her purpose in constructing a practice, is the
foundation of the approach. This is a significant advancement on existing ‘political’
theories of human rights, which have tended to use, as their foundation for defin-
ing the purpose of human rights practice, a putative historical/social fact that the
83 Jackson, Quasi-States; Peter B. Evans, ‘The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era
of Globalization’, World Politics, 50:1 (1997), pp. 62–87; Toni Erskine, ‘Assigning Responsibilities to
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versity Press, 2009).
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Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
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purpose of the practice of human rights is to assign duties to states and to place
conditions on practices of sovereignty.
Conclusion
It is one thing to say that we need to study ‘practice’. This project is well under
way. It is another thing to claim that one is studying a practice by studying specific
practitioners, such as human rights practitioners, security practitioners, or diplomacy
practitioners. In order to study specific practicioners, it is important to have a
method that allows one to locate a practice’s boundaries, in order to determine
what (and who) is in, and what (and who) is out. One cannot justifiably say things
such as ‘human rights practice is like this’ or ‘security practices are like that’ if one
has helped oneself to an account of what and whom to study in the first place. Adler
and Pouliot tend to privilege practical sense, in a way that leaves questions about the
actual location of specific practices under-problematised. This article enables scholars
to be more explicit, in future research about practices and practitioners, about the
methods that are being used in order to define and to locate practices.
The article exposed weaknesses in the agreement, contextual, and value methods
for locating an international practice. Firstly, the agreement method either has too
narrow and legalistic a conception of what counts as part of a practice, or otherwise
needs to be supplemented with other methods – for example, the contextual method
or the value method – in order to explain why speech acts that do not include exact
concepts (such as ‘human rights’) should count as part of a practice. According to
the agreement method, the normativity of practices is also reduced to the notion
of consent. This provides a clear bridge between analytical statements about what
practices are, and the normative reality of practitioners’ reasons to practise, but this
clarity comes at a price: consent is a problematic basis for normativity. Secondly,
and by comparison, the contextual method lacks any bridge – even a problematic
one – between the analytical and the normative. It therefore lacks a response, for
practice-based logics of action, to the same problem that others have identified in
the logic of appropriateness: human agents often show a knack for overriding their
rule-based or habit-based programming in order to do what, in their judgement, is
right. It is a feature of our world that practitioners think that they have reasons
to practice. It is a prima facie weakness of a method for locating a practice if it has
trouble locating social objects that fit with this feature of reality. Thirdly, the value
method results in practices dropping out of the picture. Practitioners would no longer
have a reason to practice, because they can assess for themselves how to pursue
values and principles directly. Other scholars might think that one of these methods
is most suitable for their questions, and for their research into practices. If so, they
would need to engage critically and constructively with these conclusions, and in
particular with the question of why the weaknesses that this article has identified
might be less significant for the sake of particular kinds of research into other inter-
national practices.
Neither a practice, on the one hand, nor an individual agent’s judgement about
what to do, on the other, is necessarily authoritative. One strength of the purpose
method is that it operates at the intersection of the two by combining reasoned judge-
ments with the construction of social practices – in a way that rejects the conservative
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acceptance of an easy and obvious alignment between a practice and an actual
practitioner’s judgement. One potential weakness of the purpose method, which was
indicated in this article, is that it rests on a substantive conception of the person from
whose standpoint human rights practice can be appropriately constructed. This
conception of the person is contestable. It is not possible to prove empirically that
a certain conception of the person is appropriate, in the same way that it is more
plausibly possible to prove that agreement about the location of a practice occurred,
or that a political idea arose in a certain context, amongst certain actors, with certain
intentions. However, this is not a significant weakness, and in my judgement, it
is not even a weakness at all. There is room for reasonable disagreement about the
conception of the idealised human rights practitioner, and about what such a person
would decide when constructing or reconstructing a practice. Having such a clear
locus for debate – having clarity on which specific, replicable steps must be taken
and justified in order to reach a conclusion – is an improvement on an egoistic or
relativistic picture, whereby the concept of human rights is taken to mean whatever
a particular individual, group, culture, or society thinks that it means at any given
moment in time. It is also improvement on a picture of social ontology in which
there are only values and principles, but no rules or practices.
By asking and answering questions about which intuitive and circumstance-based
judgements an idealised practitioner – whose purpose it is to fill a specific practical
gap in international-political life – would arrive at in today’s context, I arrived at
the suggestion that modern actors who, firstly, due to a degree of control over the
means of organised violence, have the capacity to cause harm to individuals, and/
or, secondly, are relevantly ‘public’ in a particular context, are candidate bearers of
responsibility for human rights. This remains so regardless of whether those actors
have been recognised as sovereign. This suggestion was provided as an illustration
of the way that the purpose method works. More detailed scholarship is needed and
called for in order to expand on this assessment of whether and how non-state actors
fit as responsibility-bearers within contemporary human rights practice. Most impor-
tantly, future research can now draw from a clear set of methods that allow one to
locate the boundaries of any international practice.
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